Question: To what extent can the ultimate failure of the 29th Brigade ‘s base against the Chinese Communist forces at the conflict of the Imjin River during the Korean War in 1951 be attributed to the defense mechanism of Hill 235?
A. Thesis: The Battle of the Imjin River occurred between 22nd-25th of April, 1951 during the 1rst Impulse of the Chinese fifth Phase Offensive of the Korean War when United Nations strategic places along the Imjin River on line Kansas were attacked by Chinese Communist forces from the North who were trying to interrupt through the defense mechanisms so as to recapture Seoul. The intent of this probe is to look into the grounds for the failure of the military personnels of the I Corps, 3rd Division, 29th British Independent Brigade, composed of three battalions with an affiliated Belgian battalion, artillery support, and another foot battalion in modesty, along the line to support their places against the onslaught of the Chinese 63rd Army.
B. Argument/Analysis
POV # 1: The 29th Brigade was immensely outnumbered by the Chinese Communist forces during the defense mechanism of their places on the Imjin River, hence giving the Chinese, who used Maoist human-wave tactics, the numerical advantage.
Beginning: Kahn, E. J. “No One but the Glosters” . The New Yorker May 26, 1951: 64-71
The 29th Brigade was composed of 1rst Battalion, Royal Gloucestershire Regiment ; 1rst Battalion, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers ; 1rst Battalion, Royal Ulster Rifles ( the modesty ) ; the 45th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery ; and the 8th King ‘s Royal Irish Hussars ( equipped with 52 ton Centurion armored combat vehicles ) .
Kahn, a well-thought-of war journalist, writes that 29th Brigade ‘s entire strength, including the affiliated Belgian battalion, was 66 100 work forces
Of those, it had a front-line combat strength of four 1000, and suffered more than a 1000 casualties during the conflict.
Because the British were better equipped, and because by and large in offense more casualties are received than in defense mechanism, despite losing a one-fourth of their combat strength and about the full Gloucester battalion, the British inflicted far more casualties to the Chinese.
Beginning: Catchpole, Brian.The Korean War, 1950-53. London: Constable & A ; Robinson Ltd. , 2000.
Over the class of the conflict, which lasted three yearss, 30000 Chinese soldiers of the 187th, 188th, and 189th had the aim of destructing the 29 Brigade.
Beginning: Farrar-Hockley, Sir Anthony H.The border of the blade: the narrative of the Glosters in the Imjin Battle in Korea.. London: F. Muller, 1954.
Farrar-Hockley, the aide to 29th Brigade, wrote that the Chinese, irrespective of the casualties they received, continued to flux infinitely.
In malice of the Chinese enormous losingss, their numerical strength non merely remained at a changeless degree throughout the conflict, but in fact increased
This was a conflict of abrasion that was being fought, and with each extra Chinese onslaught, the Brigade ‘s place was weakened.
During the defense mechanism of Hill 235, the Chinese, demoing indifference to danger, would make damage every clip they attacked the 1rst Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment ( informally known as the “Glosters” ) , and with each extra assault, the Chinese “burp” ( sub-machine ) guns and their stray grenades would pull off to stack up casualties on the British side, even though they received more casualties themselves in the procedure.
Beginning: Hastings, Max. The Korean War. London: Pan Books, 2000.
The Chinese had high quality in Numberss and indifference to casualties, and with each extra assault, even as they were repulsed, the British place easy deteriorated.
Beginning: Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Volume Two. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.
The Gloucester Battalion was the most to a great extent affected by the Chinese human-wave tactics ; of the 622 Gloucesters who were in the most advanced of the brigade ‘s three echelons, merely five officers and 34 other ranks were available for responsibility after the conflict.
Beginning: Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Volume Two. Lincoln, Nebraska: Unversity of Nebraska Press, 1998.
Small fireteams of Chinese would near undetected during the dark and acquire within grenade scope, so rush the military personnels utilizing daze tactics
This was used most efficaciously against A Company of the Gloucesters, whose place on Castle Hill was being overrun before the concentration of the Gloucester Battalion on Hill 235
POV # 2: Hill 235, the hill where the four companies of the Gloucester battalion ( A, B, C, and D Companies ) concentrated to on the eventide of April 23rd, was easy cut off from supply, doing it debatable for the British military personnels to go on firing, as they would finally run abruptly on slugs and other necessities.
Beginning: Varhola, Michael J. Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953. New York City, New York: De Capo Press, 200.
The conflict began good for the Gloucesters, as their standing patrol from C Company on the river repulsed the Chinese four times without taking casualties themselves, until holding to retreat due to utilizing up all their ammo.
The absolute unsuitableness of the brigade deployment for run intoing an full-scale onslaught by big forces made itself clear, as each company of the Gloucesters had to run into the Chinese entirely, without common fire support.
At this point the Chinese were traversing the river at a twelve different topographic points, and had launched onslaughts on the north-most companies of the Gloucesters, A and D.
They were having limited air support as the Chinese were prosecuting United Nations military personnels at other parts of the Imjin every bit good at the same clip, such as at the nearby conflict of Kapyong.
They had need for heavier heavy weapon but the Gloucesters ‘ American military affair officer had been withdrawn a few yearss before the conflict and they had no agencies of naming in 155mm fire.
By flushing April 23rd, it was evident that the forward battalions of 29 Brigade had to concentrate to last, and at 8:30 PM, A, C, and D companies pulled back to Hill 235, where the Battalion HQ was located.
B Company had been cut off and was endured seven major onslaughts during the dark, losing much of their work forces. The subsisters managed to draw back to Hill 235 at first visible radiation.
Beginning: Catchpole, Brian.The Korean War, 1950-53. London: Constable & A ; Robinson Ltd. , 2000.
The subsisters of 1rst Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, gathered on Hill 235, were cut off from retreat and possibility of support by the enemy who had surrounded them.
They could non be resupplied, as the enemy was all over their place, and any supply plane trying to acquire near adequate to aerate bead supplies would be shot at
Beginning: Farrar-Hockley, Sir Anthony H.The border of the blade: the narrative of the Glosters in the Imjin Battle in Korea.. London: F. Muller, 1954.
Because of the battalion ‘s inability to have supply beads, ammo was running really low and the wireless ‘s were running out of batteries, doing communicating between companies hard
Beginning: Kahn, E. J.. “ NO ONE BUT THE GLOSTERS ” .The New YorkerMay 26, 1951: 64-71.
The Glosters begged several times on the 24th for a chopper to come and evacuate their more earnestly wounded but the enemy was excessively close on all sides for any chopper to be sent, or any supplies to be dropped.
Beginning: Appleman, Lt. Col. Roy E..Ridgway Duels for Korea. Texas: Texas A & A ; M University Press, 1990.
From daytime of 24 April on, the Gloucester Battalion had merely a limited clip to get away.
An effort to deliver the Gloucester Battalion on the 24th by the 8th Hussars and 10th Philippine Brigade Combat Team with a combined figure of 14 armored combat vehicles failed due to the lead armored combat vehicle in the column being disabled, barricading the route.
POV # 3: The 29th Brigade unpreparedness for onslaught, ensuing in a general deficiency of defensive readyings, was responsible for the installation through which the Chinese Communist forces were able to go around and destruct the battalions, bring downing high loss of life.
Beginning: Hastings, Max. The Korean War. London: Pan Books, 2000.
The hill scope of the Imjin appeared really defendable, with its highest extremum, Kamak-san, lifting to 2000 pess. It was non every bit defendable as it looked, nevertheless, as the river was shallow plenty to be easy forded, showing small trouble to an aggressor.
The commanding officer of the Brigade ‘s applied scientist squadron, Major Tony Younger, was dismayed at the deficiency of safeguards being taken. Harmonizing to him, the Brigade was non in a defensive frame of head and did non even know precisely where on the forepart the Imjin was fordable.
The commanding officer of the artilleryman battery, Major Guy Ward, found the general ambiance among the military personnels to be excessively relaxed.
The brigade ‘s places were neither profoundly dug, nor wired, nor mined, as they had no purpose of maintaining them for long.
The places were seen every bit impermanent as the program was to utilize them as a springboard to progress further north
The foot lacked heavy heavy weapon support, and was hence handicapped in certain respects
Soldiers were unhappy with their arrangement, reasoning for concentrating battalions where effectual common support could be provided, such as from the tallness of Kamak-san, which besides had great natural defense mechanisms and entree to abundant H2O supply.
Despite all the intelligence indicants of an at hand Chinese offense, the absence of enemy activities straight in forepart of Brodie ‘s work forces – as brigade patrols had failed to pick up marks of enemy motion to the north – seemed to propose that the blow would fall elsewhere, and the place on the Imjin River was considered to be safe.
Throughout the dark of 22-23 April, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers ‘ Ten and Z companies came to be under onslaught, coercing the Fusiliers ‘ X Company to retreat before first visible radiation and Z Company to give up its place.
Because of that action, at 6:10 AM on the 23rd, the Chinese were able to derive a key hill place overlooking the route junction held by Z company, short-circuiting Y Company wholly and striking from behind it.
The Fusiliers were hence compelled to fall back, and were covered by the Centurion armored combat vehicles of the 8th Hussars.
The action of the Northumberland Fusiliers losing such critical land so early in the conflict is seen as holding had serious effects and is unfastened to unfavorable judgment
This led to the Chinese foot being able to fire upon their heavy weapon places and set uping themselves on the high land of Kamak-san.
Beginning: Appleman, Lt. Col. Roy E..Ridgway Duels for Korea. Texas: Texas A & A ; M University Press, 1990.
General Soule felt concern about the places he held. He thought the Chinese Communist Forces would hit in the locality of the meeting of the Hantan and Imjin rivers and endanger the 65th Infantry, to the right of the 29th Brigade. He placed the Belgian Battalion diagonally across the trigon formed by the two rivers to beef up the junction.
The river was at a low phase, and it was easy to ford in legion topographic points.
A stat mi below “Gloster Crossing” , the name given to the Ford on the Imjin used by the Gloucesters, the Chinese found an submerged span or built-up Ford, that the British did non cognize about, and 100s crossed the river at that place.
Beginning: Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War, America in Korea 1950-1953. New York: Random House, Inc. , 1987.
Merely cardinal points were held by the 29th Brigade and there was light sidelong contact between companies, allow entirely between battalions.
Under the conditions described above, it was impossible to forestall incursion by a strong, well-organized, and skillfully executed onslaught carried out by dark, which is what happened on the eventide of the 22nd of April, when the 29th Brigade ‘ s places were attacked.
Beginning: Hickey, Michael. The Korean War, The West Confronts Communism 1950-1953. London: John Murray Publishers, 1999.
3rd US Infantry Division, commanded by Major-General Robert H. Soule, was deployed on the most important and parlous topographic point on the line.
Small attempt had been made to delve significant fieldworks
None of the battalions were wired in, and anti-personnel mines had non been laid.
POV # 4: The 29th Brigade line had big spreads that, when discovered, gave the Chinese forces chances to go around the battalions and cut off their support
Beginning: Hastings, Max. The Korean War. London: Pan Books, 2000.
The 29 Brigade possessed pitifully little Numberss to cover seven and a half stat mis of forepart.
The Brigade ‘s commanding officer, Brigadier Tom Brodie, chose to place his work forces in separate unit places centered upon cardinal hill characteristics, go forthing spreads between battalions which might be penetrated.
Beginning: Appleman, Lt. Col. Roy E..Ridgway Duels for Korea. Texas: Texas A & A ; M University Press, 1990.
By forenoon of 24 April, the 187th and 188th divisions of the Chinese 63rd Army had been able to go around the Gloucesters place through the big spread that they had found between the Gloucesters, to the left, and the Fusiliers, to the right. By so, they were five stat mis behind the Gloucesters ‘ place.
With the big spread between the Gloucesters and the remainder of 29th Brigade penetrated, enemy in really big Numberss was able to go through around the right wing of the Gloucesters during the dark of 24 April.
By the forenoon of the 25th, another big spread that existed on the left wing of the Gloucesters had besides been penetrated, and the Gloucester Battalion found itself wholly isolated and surrounded.
The Gloucester Battalion places from the start had non been good, as the rifle companies, which were located on separate hills around the small town of Choksong, could non back up each other reciprocally, doing them vulnerable to divide enemy onslaught and the danger of being overrun individually, which is what happened to each one.
Beginning: Farrar-Hockley, Sir Anthony H.The border of the blade: the narrative of the Glosters in the Imjin Battle in Korea.. London: F. Muller, 1954.
Each of the units was forced to contend a solitary conflict, to defy pig-headedly until the enemy ‘s purpose was clear.
Beginning: Hickey, Michael. The Korean War, The West Confronts Communism 1950-1953. London: John Murray Publishers, 1999.
General Soule, the commanding officer of the US 3rd Division, had a defensive forepart larger than he had work forces to cover it.
29 Brigade was placed on the left with 17,000 paces of river line to cover, with the 65th US Infantry Regiment on the right
The battalions within the brigade were sited far apart and incapable of common fire support
Even within the battalions, the rifle companies were deployed up to a mile apart from each other
This grade of scattering did non look to worry any of the senior commanding officers, although Brigadier Brodie was discerning at the idea of what might go on if the Chinese mounted an assault.
POV # 5: The deficiency of communicating and misunderstandings of some of the higher superior commanding officers who were doing the determinations, particularly the 3rd Division commanding officer, Major General Robert H. Soule, resulted in a hapless analysis of the state of affairs and false premises, which in bend led to hapless determination devising.
Beginning: Hickey, Michael. The Korean War, The West Confronts Communism 1950-1953. London: John Murray Publishers, 1999.
There was small sense of urgency in divisional and corps HQ, who were moving under the premise that the Chinese would first try examining onslaughts before their major river traversing assault.
This was an unsound premise, as was made more and more obvious during the conflict, as the enemy had been carry oning covert reconnaissance missions during the yearss prior to the onslaught, and had plotted 29 Brigade ‘s place down to company degree.
General Van Fleet had ordered the military personnels to stay on the Kansas line because of his belief in the ground forces ‘s firepower high quality, which would collar the Chinese progress.
He believed that the Chinese dark onslaughts could be fought away and that air support and heavy weapon could destruct the enemy.
Van Fleet did non recognize the Chinese ability to dissemble their motions during the twenty-four hours
There was a misinterpretation when Soule called Brigadier Brodie, the commanding officer of the 29th, to state him of the 2nd alleviation effort for the Gloucestershire Regiment that would take topographic point on the 25th of April, to inquire him what the state of affairs was. Brodie replied that it was “pretty sticky” , and understatement lost on Soule, who as an American General would hold described it as being black.
Soule hence gave the order at that point, the eventide of the 24th of April, for the Gloucesters to stay where they were until the alleviation effort came.
Soule ‘s determination here, alternatively of stating the Gloucesters to withdraw, was efficaciously responsible for destining them to decease or imprisonment.
Beginning: Hastings, Max. The Korean War. London: Pan Books, 2000.
A British officer at caput quarters believed that the American bid, under whom the British 29th Brigade was functioning, did non hold on the badness of the state of affairs of the Gloucesters, stating that Brodie was twice told by American Corps Head Quarters that he could non retreat.
When A Company of the Gloucesters was to be overrun, the company commanding officer, Pat Angier, spoke to Col. James Carne, the dominating officer of the Gloucesters, inquiring for permission to withdraw or for supports. Carne relayed this message to central offices, who responded stating that the place had to be held, “at all costs” , even though the company was clearly to be wiped out.
Col. Carne was compelled to state the subsisters to keep on, because if A Company ‘s place was wholly overrun, the other companies ‘ places besides became indefensible.
On the dark of the 24th, when the orders came for the Brigade to retreat, the moving commanding officer of the Royal Ulster Rifles, Major Gerald Rickford, expressed discontent with the degree of information that was being communicated from the battalion central office.
He had non been told about the Belgian backdown that had happened earlier, the exposure on the Brigade ‘s right wing that had happened as a consequence of this, or even about the Gloucesters ‘ quandary.
There was farther unfavorable judgment of Brigadier Brodie by the Ulsters, who were unhappy with the program of retreat ordered by him: they had suggested withdrawing along the ridge they were presently on, being able to maintain the enemy down below, but Brodie had ordered them to fall and do their retreat on the route.
Beginning: Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War, America in Korea 1950-1953. New York: Random House, Inc. , 1987.
Soule ‘s determination devising on the twenty-four hours when ordered the Gloucesters to keep their place until the 2nd alleviation effort would get was influenced by the traditional British military understatement.
James Carne was inclined to understate his state of affairss and had conveyed the feeling to Tom Brodie that the Gloucesters were in pretty just form and there was no great exigency.
Brodie, in bend, had passed that feeling to Soule, and Soule was to be faulted for neglecting to take this into history.
As a consequence of the British understatement and deficit of militias, Soule ‘s alleviation program for the Gloucesters was unequal.
Brodie was angry at Soule as he had been warning him for a piece that unless he authorized the Gloucesters to retreat, they would be cut off, and that Gloucesters ended up acquiring cut off.
After the conflict, General Matthey Ridgway, commanding officer of the US 8th Army, issued a public statement which could be read partially as a public disapprobation of the members of the higher bid, such as Soule for the destiny of the Gloucesters.
In it, he wrote that “The basic duty of bid is to expect when and where the potentially decisive stages of conflict will happen, and to be at that place during the development in order to obtain from commanding officers and from conditions on the topographic point at the clip of action, an accurate detection of the state of affairs, as the best footing for bid decisions.”
General Van Fleet put most of the incrimination on Soule ‘s “tardiness” in measuring the unstable place of the Gloucesters and for neglecting to do “timely decisions” that might hold saved it.
Beginning: Appleman, Lt. Col. Roy E..Ridgway Duels for Korea. Texas: Texas A & A ; M University Press, 1990.
On the eventide of 10 September 1951, the writer had an interview with Brigadier Brodie where Brodie stated that he would take 50 per centum of the duty for neglecting to do clear to General Soule how serious the state of affairs was.
Lieutenant Colonel Alvin L. Newberry, commanding officer of the 19th Field Artillery Battalion, attended a conference in the forenoon of 25 April in the 29th Brigade muss collapsible shelter when the relied of the Gloucesters was being discussed. He felt that, Brodie, who was stand foring a state proud in everything military-wise, did non desire to inquire for aid shortly plenty.
In the conference, Brodie was asked if British Centurion armored combat vehicles should take part with the light M-24 armored combat vehicles from the 65th Tank Company which would be sent to alleviate the Gloucesters, Brodie relied in the negative.
POV # 6: Continued force per unit area on the 29th Brigade by the Chinese forces, which prevented alleviation acquiring through to the Gloucesters, forced many of the companies to abandon their places, which led to the general retreat of the forces on the 25th of April.
Beginning: Hickey, Michael. The Korean War, The West Confronts Communism 1950-1953. London: John Murray Publishers, 1999.
On the forenoon of the 23rd of April, Brodie was visited by Soule`s Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Mead. Brodie drew attending to the deficiency of militias.
Mead instantly radioed Soule, who agreed to direct the 65th Infantry Regiment, the Filipino battalion group, to assist.
The determination was made early on the 23rd of April to withdraw the Belgian battalion, as the Chinese, who spotted the exposure in the arrangement of the Belgians early on, had made assaults on the place and would infest it shortly.
Brodie had the purpose to withdraw the Belgians utilizing the Fords covered by the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers and taking two of their company places, enabling Colonel Kingsley Foster, the commanding officer of the Fusiliers, to concentrate his work forces.
He was determined to keep back his militias: the Royal Ulster Rifles and the 8th Hussars, merely to be used in instance of the state of affairs going more dire
Brodie asked Soule for a deliverance mission for the Belgians. Soule sent armor from the 7th Infantry and an foot battalion to untangle them.
By the terminal of the 23rd, the Belgian battalion had been retreated to the dorsum of the rear places.
Beginning: Catchpole, Brian.The Korean War, 1950-53. London: Constable & A ; Robinson Ltd. , 2000.
It was a blooper that the Brigade was non pulled back every bit shortly as the graduated table of the Chinese assault became clear
The incrimination mostly put on the commanding officer of the US I Corps, Frank Milburn, and Major-General Soule for non holding gone frontward in the conflict zone personally to measure the state of affairs.
Beginning: Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War, America in Korea 1950-1953. New York: Random House, Inc. , 1987.
At 5:00 AM April 25, Frank W. Milburn, commanding officer of the US I Corps, issued orders for I Corps to abandon Line Kansas and retreat to a line 10 stat mis south of Kansas
The 3rd Division were to first untangle the Gloucesters
At 9:00 AM, the British Brigade began retreating, and on Hill 235, Carne had given his four company commanding officers permission to contend their units out independently
A, B, and C Companies went south, but the bulk of the work forces were captured
D Company went north, so to the West, so south, where they met with American armored combat vehicles and were extricated.
C. Conclusion: The Battle of the Imjin River resulted in the 29th Brigade enduring 25 per centum casualties, around one 1000 in entire, but in return it had shattered the Chinese Communist Forces ‘ 63rd ground forcess severely plenty for it to be withdrawn from combat ( an estimated 11,000 casualties ) and had helped queer the Chinese progress to Seoul. Three divisions of General Peng ‘s forces – the 187th, 188th, and 189th – had been broken, at the cost of 1,000 lives, a one-fourth of the British forepart line strength. Lack of readiness for the onslaught was the chief ground for the British battalions being overrun, as because the place of the 29th Brigade was non seen as the topographic point where the violative would strike, Brodie ‘s battalions were spread excessively far apart, holding spreads in between the battalions and the companies within the battalions themselves, through which the enemy was able to environ them and assail them individually. A big blooper had besides been made by non naming for the backdown of the Gloucesters shortly plenty, alternatively believing that they could be relieved and the place held, allowing the Gloucesters to acquire cut off by enemy flanking, and surrounded, ensuing in a big figure of casualties.
Mentions:
Appleman, Lt. Col. Roy E..Ridgway Duels for Korea. Texas: Texas A & A ; M University Press, 1990.
Barclay, Cyril Nelson. The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-
1953. Aldershot U.K. : Gale & A ; Polden Publishing, 1954.
“ Battle of the Imjin River ” . Office of the Defence Attache, British Embassy Seoul. Nov 03, 2009
& lt ; hypertext transfer protocol: //ukinkorea.fco.gov.uk/en/working-with-korea/defence-relations/gloster-valley/battle-imjin & gt ; .
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